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Abstract 
In the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), both the goods being valued and the payment 
vehicles used to value them are mostly hypothetical. However, although numerous studies 
have examined the impact of experience with the good on the willingness to pay, less 
attention has been given to experience with the payment vehicles. This paper examines how 
experience with payment vehicles influences responses to a CV scenario on the maintenance 
of irrigation canals. Specifically, the paper uses a split-sample survey to investigate the effects 
of experience with monetary and labour payment vehicles on the acceptance of a CV scenario 
and protest bids. Using convergent validity tests, we found that experience acquired from 
using both monetary and labour payment vehicles reduces the asymmetries in acceptance 
rates. These findings suggest that experience with payment vehicles reduces time/money 
response asymmetries in the CVM. 
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1.0: Introduction 
A recurrent finding from contingent valuation (CV) studies in developing countries is that 
respondents are more likely to state a positive willingness to pay (WTP) and a higher mean 
WTP when the valuation is based on a labour payment vehicle rather than a monetary 
payment vehicle (see Swallow and Woudyalew, 1994; Echessah et al., 1997; Hung et al., 
2007). The relatively higher acceptance rates for non-monetary payment numéraires have also 
been observed in revealed preferences (Lee et al., 1999) and in experimental settings 
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2009). These variations in responses to CV surveys hinder 
pooling of CV data (Layton and Lee, 2006), and according to Diamond and Hausman (1994), 
also question the credibility of the CVM. Meanwhile, the attitude–behaviour models (Fishbein 
and Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen, 1991) and the Discovered Preference Hypothesis (Plott, 1996), 
postulate that decision bias is reduced in repeated and familiar choice environments. 
Therefore, the time/money response asymmetry should decrease with experience and in 
familiar decision-making environments. The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the 
effects of experience with monetary and labour payment vehicles on the acceptance of CV 
scenarios and protest bids.  
In the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), both the environmental goods/scenarios and 
payment vehicles are hypothetical. The hypothetical framing in CV studies creates 
discrepancies between actual and stated preferences (see e.g. Neill et al., 1994; Loomis et al., 
1996; List, 2001). This hypothetical bias remains a concern to the design and conduct of CV 
surveys and the use of the CV in public policy. However, a number of theories suggest that 
respondents with experience provide more realistic WTP responses in stated preferences (see 
e.g. Plott, 1996; Bjornstad et al., 1997; Kahneman and Sugden, 2005). According to Plott 
(1996), repeated decisions about WTP choices and feedback on the consequences of these 
decisions promotes institutional and value learning, i.e. discovering the features of one’s own 
preferences. Thus, when respondents face new decisions, they may experience uncertainties 
which introduce a systematic bias. However, when these decisions are repeated, the 
uncertainties and consequent systematic biases are reduced. The attitude-behaviour models of 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and Ajzen (1991) arrive at similar conclusions. Furthermore, 
studies show that market experience attenuates hypothetical bias and reduces the WTA-WTP 
discrepancy in the CVM (List, 2003). Therefore, familiarity with the decision-making 
environment addresses a number of anomalous behaviours.  
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Both experimental and non-experimental literature have analyzed how experience of 
environmental goods affects WTP values for them (e.g. Whitehead et al., 1995; Cameron and 
Englin, 1997; Turpie, 2003; Kniivila, 2006; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008). These studies 
conclude that the welfare values for goods with which respondents have experience differ 
from the welfare values for goods with which they have no experience. However, although 
much attention has been given to the issue of how experience with the good being valued 
affects the respondent’s WTP, considerably less attention has been given to the issue of 
whether experience with the payment vehicle matters in the CVM. 
Payment vehicles play a crucial role in CV studies. Such vehicles provide a context for the 
payment, and their credibility has a major influence on convincing the respondents of the 
genuineness or frivolity of the survey. For this reason, most recommendations for the design 
and conduct of CV surveys postulate payment vehicles that are realistic and neutral (see e.g. 
Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Arrow et al., 1993). As a result, a number of empirical studies 
assess the effect of payment vehicles on the WTP. For instance, Bergstrom et al. (2004) 
compare mean WTP for water quality protection in the United States (US) under tax 
reallocation and special tax, and find that mean WTP under tax reallocation is higher than 
mean WTP under special tax. Wiser (2007) compares mandatory with voluntary payment 
vehicles used for valuing renewable energy among US households. Wiser finds higher mean 
WTP under mandatory payment mechanisms than under their voluntary equivalents. In a 
related study, Ivehammar (2009) compares using a local tax as a payment vehicle with three 
other payment vehicles in the valuation of environmental externalities (so-called 
environmental encroachment) in road transportation in Sweden. She concludes, among other 
things, that payment vehicles influence the mean WTP. Using an open-ended CVM, Bateman 
et al. (1995) compare proportions of zero WTP bids under general donations, donations to a 
specific fund, and direct taxation. In the latter study, significant differences in the proportions 
of zero bids were observed among the three donation mechanisms. Thus, there is 
overwhelming evidence that the choice of payment vehicle influences both the level of WTP 
and the acceptance rates of a scenario. However, whether experience with the payment 
vehicle may itself have an impact remains to be investigated. 
Different numéraires have been adopted in the elicitation of preferences in the CVM. The 
monetary numéraire, whereby the WTP for goods is stated in monetary units, is the most 
common for eliciting WTP. However, an increasing number of CV studies in developing 
countries have adopted non-monetary numéraires. Shyamsundar and Kramer (1996) adopt 
4 
 
rice as the numéraire to estimate losses to rural households from tropical forest protection in 
Madagascar due to a limited cash economy among the respondents. Also, the respondents in a 
study may be more familiar with non-monetary numéraires in mobilising resources for the 
provision of local public goods. For instance, it is common for common pool resource users to 
mobilise labour and/or money to support natural resource management. For this reason, 
Swallow and Woudyalew (1994) and Echessah et al. (1997) adopt money and labour to value 
tsetse fly control in Kenya and Ethiopia, respectively. Similarly, Hung et al. (2007) elicit 
WTP values for forest fire prevention using labour and money in Vietnam. Results from these 
studies indicate that a labour numéraire is associated with higher acceptance among 
respondents in comparison with a monetary numéraire. Moreover, using the average wage 
rate of a casual worker, Echessah et al. (1997) found that the mean WTP is higher under the 
labour payment vehicle than under the monetary payment vehicle. Eom and Larson (2006) 
argue that, theoretically, when choices are constrained by both time and money, welfare 
values can be elicited using either numéraire. In addition to the theoretical model, these 
authors suggest that the higher acceptance rates and higher mean WTP for labour could be 
linked to a low valuation of time and hypothetical bias.  
Two broad explanations can be found for the higher acceptance rates under non-monetary 
payment vehicles in the CVM. The first holds that market imperfections may restrict the 
substitution among different resource endowments. For instance, liquidity constraints could 
compel respondents to adopt non-monetary payment vehicles rather than their monetary 
counterparts. The second explanation, the Discovered Preference Hypothesis, suggests decay 
in decision biases in repeated-choice environments (see Braga and Starmer, 2005). Therefore, 
in repeated-choice environments, the money/time asymmetry tends to disappear in the CVM. 
Hung et al. (2007) argue that the acceptability of payment in workdays in the CVM may be 
due to prior use of such payments, and, thus, offers a much more realistic payment vehicle. 
This has been the basis for adopting labour numéraires to elicit preferences in the CVM in 
developing countries (see Swallow and Woudyalew, 1994; Echessah et al., 1997). While 
market imperfections may imply different mean WTP values depending on payment vehicles, 
increased familiarity with the payment vehicles should reduce these differences according to 
the second explanation. 
In this study, we evaluate the effects of experience with monetary and labour payment 
vehicles on responses to a CV scenario by comparing acceptance rates and protest bids of two 
sub-samples. Respondents in one of the two sub-samples have experience with both monetary 
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and labour payment vehicles, while respondents in the other sub-sample have been using only 
the labour payment vehicle to mobilize resources to maintain common irrigation canals. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section describes the study area and how resources 
are mobilised to maintain the irrigation canals. The third section provides the analytical 
framework of the study and explains the CV scenario as well as the sampling method. The 
fourth section presents the results from the study, while the conclusions are provided in the 
final section. 
 
2.0 Afife Irrigation Project in Ghana 
The 2008 World Development Report notes that the irrigation infrastructure in sub-Saharan 
African countries is inadequate. Only about 4% of total land in the region is irrigated (World 
Bank, 2007). In addition, the existing infrastructure is poorly maintained – further reducing 
the actual percentage of land irrigated. Evidence of poor maintenance of irrigation dams and 
canals is manifest in eroded dam walls, inoperative spillways, and siltation. The World Bank 
(2007) also notes that the operation and maintenance of public irrigation systems remain a 
problem in many developing countries. Public irrigation systems suffer from chronic 
underinvestment in maintenance. Even in countries where farmers are charged with operation 
and maintenance costs, persistently low collection of irrigation fees is a common problem due 
to the high incidence of non-compliance. Thus, improved management of the inadequate 
irrigation canals in sub-Saharan African countries is imperative.  
Devolution is a common mandate for managing common pool resources; and devolution 
policies require resource users to make monetary and non-monetary sacrifices to support 
participatory resource management. The devolution of resource management in Ghana has 
been an integral part of decentralizing governance, according to the Ghanaian Government’s 
Structural Adjustment Programme and its Ministry of Food and Agriculture’s Accelerated 
Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy, since the 1980s (Ofori, 2000). In the early 
1990s, the Government introduced Participatory Irrigation Management programmes. These 
decentralization programmes have transferred responsibility for the maintenance of irrigation 
canals from the central government to local governments and farmers.  
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Among the many projects promoting irrigation farming in Ghana is the Afife Irrigation 
Project. With technical assistance from China, a dam was constructed in 1983 to irrigate more 
than 1,000 hectares of plots for rice production. It operates gravity-type irrigation and, 
therefore, relies on the canals supplying irrigation water being maintained. The plots are 
divided into 11 sections, with each section measuring about 100 hectares, and were allocated 
to about 2,000 peasant households. Currently, the project falls under the Ghana Irrigation 
Development Authority. 
When the project began in 1983, the Ghanaian Government was responsible for maintaining 
the canals, and it employed workers to do so. At that time, the canals were properly 
maintained. However, after 1990, these responsibilities were transferred to the farmers 
themselves. Farmers mobilised labour to maintain the canals. However, many reports have 
indicated that the canals have not been properly maintained under the new management 
regime; this lack of maintenance is reflected in increased siltation in the canals. Under the 
current management, which started around 1997–2000, farmers in sections 1 to 8 switched to 
contributing money for the maintenance of the canals. They contribute about 3 Ghana Cedi 
(GHS) or output equivalents per hectare per season to finance the canals’ maintenance. This 
was equivalent to about 2 US dollars at the time of the survey in 2009. However, farmers in 
sections 9 to 11 continue to mobilise time of about 3 hours per season to maintain the canals. 
According to the extension officers, each section has its own leaders who decide what 
methods to employ to mobilise resources for the canals’ maintenance. The decision to adopt 
monetary or labour contributions to finance canal maintenance in a specific section largely 
reflects the preferences of the section leader. 
 
3.0: Methodology, Data and Models 
3.1: Theoretical Model 
Two different comparisons were made in the present study, i.e. between monetary and non-
monetary payment vehicles, and between experience and no experience with a certain 
payment vehicle. These comparisons were made for a CV scenario for the mobilisation of 
resources among users of a common pool resource. The welfare estimates for the change in 
environmental goods (i.e. maintenance of the irrigation canals) are elicited in both monetary 
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and non-monetary (i.e. labour) payment vehicles. The welfare estimate for the improvement 
of the quality of irrigation canals when the monetary payment vehicle is used is – 
 ( ) ( )1 0, , ; , , ;m m mV y WTP q Z V y q Z− =p p  (1) 
where ( )mV  is the indirect utility function, y  is the income, 0q  is the existing quality of the 
irrigation canals, 1q is the improved quality of the irrigation canals and 1 0q q> , mWTP is the 
willingness to pay for the improvement in irrigation canals elicited in monetary units, p is the 
vector of prices, and Z denotes socio-economic variables.  
Similarly, labour time can be mobilised to provide for change in the environmental quality. 
Since time is an economic resource, the value of environmental change can be expressed in 
terms of the value of time. Following the theoretical model devised by Eom and Larson 
(2006), we can derive WTP for maintenance of the irrigation facility using labour as the 
numéraire ( lWTP ), as follows: 
 ( ) ( )1 0, , ; , , ;f fl l lV l WTP q Z V l q Z− =f fp p  (2) 
where ( )lV   is the indirect utility function, lWTP  is the willingness to pay for the 
improvement in the irrigation facility elicited in labour units, fl is the full budget, fp is the 
vector of full prices, 0q  is the existing quality of the irrigation canals, 1q is the improved 
quality of the irrigation infrastructure and 1 0q q> , and Z denotes socio-economic variables. 
The notion of full budget (or price) combines income (or price) and time endowments. Note 
that the full budget and full prices can be stated in either monetary or non-monetary units (see 
Eom and Larson, 2006). In this case, the full budget and full prices are stated in labour units.  
The extensive adoption of labour to provide common pool resources in developing countries 
has permitted the conduct of CV studies using labour as the payment vehicle. These studies 
include those done by Swallow and Woudyalew (1994) and Echessah et al. (1997) to value 
tsetse control in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively, and Hung et al. (2007) for fire prevention 
in Vietnam. These studies also compare the responses under labour and monetary payment 
vehicles. The findings indicate that the acceptance rates are higher under labour payment 
vehicles than under their monetary payment counterparts. Echessah et al. (1997) also compare 
mean WTP under the two payment vehicles. Their conclusions indicate that mean WTP is 
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higher under the labour than the monetary payment vehicle. However, the effects of the 
choice of payment vehicles on protest bids were not presented in these studies.  
In the context of the CVM, a number of theories can explain behaviour or response. The 
Discovered Preference Hypothesis suggests changes in responses to WTP questions. 
According to Plott (1996), rational choices go through three stages, with decreasing levels of 
error in the decision-making. In Stage 1, where experience is completely absent in the choice 
environment, responses are impulsive and make little sense. However, Stages 2 and 3 involve 
repeated choices and, as a result, incorporate awareness and experience. Choices in Stages 2 
and 3 approach rational ones. Therefore, there is institutional and value learning in choices 
(Braga and Starmer, 2005). Whereas institutional learning enables one to learn how to avoid 
errors, value learning offers an agent the environment to learn about one’s preferences.  
Similarly, attitude-behaviour models in the social psychology of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) 
and Ajzen (1991) offer explanations on the motives behind planned behaviour; and Spash et 
al. (2009) relate these attitude-behaviour models to responses in the CVM. For instance, 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) discuss how correspondence, proximity and familiarity criteria 
influence the degree of association between attitudes or intentions and behaviour. The greater 
the correspondence between attitude and intention, the closer the behaviour will be to the 
intention. Also, the proximity criterion concludes that, if the intervening stages between a 
component in a model and behaviour are few, then the predictive power of that component 
should be higher. Finally, the familiarity condition states that, the more familiar an agent is 
with a specific behaviour, the greater the predictive power of the agent’s attitude in respect of 
his/her behaviour. A number of studies use the CVM to investigate how experience and 
access to more information affects WTP. Some of these studies conclude that experience with 
the goods or giving respondents more information about the goods increases the mean WTP 
(e.g. Whitehead et al., 1995; Cameron and Englin, 1997; Turpie, 2003; Kniivila, 2006; 
Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008); and giving respondents time to think about the CV scenario 
enables them to submit lower bids for the scenarios offered (Whittington et al., 1992). The 
conclusions of these studies indicate that provision of information and time and having 
previous experience with the good matters in CVM.  
Market imperfections affect both the probability of accepting a CV scenario and the value of 
the WTP. Under market imperfections, one resource endowment cannot easily be converted 
into another, and different payment vehicles will exhibit different probabilities of accepting 
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the CV scenario and will lead to different WTP values. The market imperfections argument 
will indicate that the results from the conduct of CV will depend on the resource endowment 
– and, for that matter, the payment vehicle. Different payment vehicles could provide a 
different total WTP for environmental goods. In terms of devolution policies, this will also 
imply that different methods of involving resource users will yield different outcomes.  
In our context, the respondents have varying degrees of experience with two payment 
vehicles, namely monetary and labour; the CV scenario itself is fairly tangible; the study area 
is well served by transport and market networks; and credit constraints are limited and fairly 
uniform in the study area. These permit us to isolate the effects of experience from other 
effects. 
 
3.2: Estimation Strategy 
The principal method used in this study is to compare the two sub-samples in terms of the 
convergence of the responses to the CV scenario under the two payment vehicles. Thus, we 
perform convergent validity tests on acceptance rates and protest bids between monetary and 
labour payment vehicles. This is performed for the respondents who have experience with 
both payment vehicles, and for those who used the labour payment vehicle only. The 
convergent validity approach can be adopted only when measurements of phenomena are 
available using two different techniques (Carson et al., 2001).  
In addition to the convergent validity tests, we estimated bid curves. Bid curves provide a 
statistical relationship between WTP and a set of independent variables; and for the open-
ended CVM, bid curves can be estimated for several reasons (Alvarez-Farizo et al., 1999). 
One reason is theoretical validity in which the expected signs of the independent variables are 
compared with a priori expectations. The statistical relationships can also be estimated as a 
test of discriminant validity, i.e. whether or not a statistical relationship that is explained by 
variations in the independent variables exists. Bid curves could also be used for value 
transfers, whereby the estimates estimated for a study are used in a different context. 
The econometric model presented in this section follows Tobin (1958). The linear regression 
model for the bid function is specified as – 
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 ;        ,ij i iy j l mε= + =xβ  (3) 
where i iy WTP=  represents the i:th respondent’s willingness to pay for improved maintenance 
of irrigation canals, ix  is a vector of independent variables, β is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated and iε is error term. The subscript j  denotes the payment vehicle used in the 
preference elicitation, with l  indicating that WTP was elicited under the labour payment 
vehicle, and m indicating its elicitation under the monetary payment vehicle. 
For a sample of N independent observations, the censored Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
(MLE) maximises the log-likelihood function for censoring from below (see Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005):  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
ln ln | , 1 ln | ,
N
i i i i
i
L d f y d F L
=
= + −∑ i iθ x θ x θ  (4) 
where θ  are the parameters of the distribution of iy , id  is an indicator variable which 
assumes the value of 1 if 0iy > , and is 0 if 0iy = . Note that, in this instance, the lower bound 
is zero ( )i.e. 0 .L =  The ( )f   is the conditional probability density function, while ( )F   is 
the cumulative density function. Depending on the correct specification of ( )* | ,if y ixθ , the 
censored MLE is consistent and asymptotically normal (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). We 
follow the existing studies with regard to the specification of ( )* | ,if y ixθ . We select the 
independent variables based on previous studies, e.g. Swallow and Woudyalew (1994); 
Echessah et al. (1997); Köhlin and Amacher (2005); Hung et al. (2007), and Barton and 
Bergland (2010). 
 
3.3: Data 
The present study conducts a CV study among farmers at the Afife Irrigation Project in Ghana 
where monetary and labour payment vehicles are being used to maintain irrigation canals. 
Within the present set-up, some of the farmers currently contribute labour towards 
maintaining the canal, while the others contribute money or its output equivalence. Those 
farmers who are currently using money had once used labour, but had later switched to 
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money/output instead. Thus, a farmer participates in only one scheme for maintaining 
irrigation canals. In a 2x2 factorial design, the study compares monetary and labour payment 
vehicles among sub-samples which have used these two payment vehicles and those who have 
used only labour. Therefore, labour and monetary payment vehicles were employed to value 
the maintenance of irrigation canals among the respondents who currently pay in labour, and 
those who once used labour but have now transferred to money as a payment vehicle. Within 
this framework, we will be able to compare the acceptance rates and protest bids under the 
two payment vehicles between the two sub-samples. 
To value the preferences for the maintenance of the irrigation canals, we propose to restore 
the quality and maintenance of irrigation canals to the level that existed until 1990, when the 
Ghanaian Government provided resources for such maintenance. 
More than 40% of the farmers in the sample have been farming since 1990. The canal 
conveys water from the dam into lateral and sub-lateral channels, and this enables rice farmers 
to gain access to the water for their plots. The change proposed in the scenario requires 
farmers to contribute labour or money to maintain the canals. The change also aimed to 
ensure compliance with rules and regulations designed by farmers for maintaining the canals. 
The change will also be sufficient to halt the degradation of the canals and restore their 
quality to the level enjoyed when the Government employed workers to maintain the 
irrigation system. This scenario is unique in the sense that the respondents have good practical 
knowledge of the CV scenario. That is, the good valued in the study is clear and practical and 
the respondents know the quality they can expect under a more effective canal management 
system. 
The data for the analyses was collected through a survey of smallholder rice farmers at the 
Afife Irrigation Project from February to May 2010. A random sample of 550 farmers was 
interviewed, using a stratified sampling technique in which respondents were sampled from 
each of the 11 sections as well as from towns and villages in the study area. A questionnaire 
was administered to each farmer in a face-to-face interview. Out of the total sample of 550, 
only 2 refused to participate in the survey. This gave us a participation rate of over 99%. The 
survey was conducted during the minor farming season. 
The questionnaire involves questions about socio-economic variables such as the farmer’s age 
and marital status; the number, age and gender of any dependents; his/her farming experience; 
the characteristics of the plot; each farmer’s total investment in soil and water conservation; 
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fertilizer adoption; and his/her current participation in joint works. To determine the 
individual discount rate, each farmer was presented with two hypothetical work programmes 
and was asked to choose one. The first, Option A, involves a programme which would reward 
a farmer with 150 GHS in a month’s time, while Option B would pay the farmer 200 GHS in 
six months’ time. The farmer was also asked to quote a value for Option B that would make 
him/her indifferent between the two programmes. The farmer’s discount rate is then 
calculated as 2
1
log ηδ
η
 
=  
 
, where 2η is the value indicated by the farmer and 1η  is the value 
of Option A, i.e. 150 GHS. Thus, if a respondent is indifferent in respect of both Options A 
and B, it implies an individual discount rate of about 33% per season. Currently, the 
moneylenders charge farmers a rate of 50% per season. Finally, we also used the replacement 
value method to estimate each farmer’s total household wealth. 
 
3.3.1 The CV Scenario 
The CV scenario starts with a general discussion of difficulties involved in maintaining 
irrigation canals. It highlights the breakdown of irrigation systems throughout the country. 
This is attributed to the lack of maintenance and clearing of the canals. Farmers generally 
assume other farmers will provide resources for the maintenance of irrigation canals and, 
therefore, shirk their own responsibility to provide for such maintenance. This often results in 
a situation where nobody maintains the canals. In addition, Government funds are scarce and 
too little is used for canal maintenance. 
In the CV scenario, a new ten-year management plan is proposed in order to restore the 
maintenance of irrigation canals. To achieve the plan’s aims will require farmers to contribute 
money or labour each year. The new management system will halt the canals’ degradation, 
and will ensure that irrigation water reaches all the farmers’ plots. The plan’s implementation 
depends on the respondents’ monetary or labour contributions as well as those of other 
farmers. If the majority of the farmers in an irrigation scheme support the plan, it will be 
implemented, and all farmers will have to make their annual monetary or non-monetary 
contributions for ten years. Assuming that the new management plan mobilises enough 
resources, it should adequately improve the current system. Also, because of its mandatory 
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nature, free riding will be curtailed. From the descriptions above, we offer the respondents a 
choice between the present situation ( )0q  and the quality that existed until 1990 ( )1q . 
 
3.3.2 Payment Vehicles  
Two versions of the questionnaire were designed: one for each of the two payment vehicles. 
Thus, one questionnaire dealt with payments made in money, and the other with payments 
made in labour. In both versions of the questionnaire, we used an open-ended rather than 
closed-ended CV format to elicit WTP. We opted for the open-ended CV format because, in 
close-knit communities, information about surveys and the choices involved moves quickly 
among community members; thus, giving different choices to different respondents could 
distort the responses (Whittington, 1998). The payment vehicles are described as mandatory 
since the voluntary payment mechanism in CV surveys does not resolve the difference 
between contingent valuation and actual payment (Hanemann, 1994; Veisten and Navrud, 
2006). This is because the voluntary payment mechanism is subject to free-riding behaviour. 
Furthermore, we adopted a ten-year planning horizon for both versions of the questionnaire. 
This is believed to make the scenario credible.  
 
4.0: Results 
The composition of the sample is presented in Table 1. Out of the 548 respondents, 348 
currently use the monetary payment vehicle to maintain the irrigation canals. Since this sub-
sample had used the labour payment vehicle in the past, they are familiar with both payment 
vehicles. A total of 246 respondents from this sub-sample were interviewed using the 
monetary-payment-vehicle version of the questionnaire, while 102 respondents were 
interviewed with its labour payment alternative. The remaining 200 respondents currently use, 
and previously used, the labour payment vehicle to maintain the canals. Of these 200 
respondents, 44 were interviewed using the monetary-payment-vehicle questionnaire, while 
the remaining 156 were interviewed with its counterpart.  
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TABLE 1: COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE   
Payment Vehicles WTP in Money  WTP in Labour     Total 
Currently using money 246 102 348 
Currently using labour 44 156 200 
Total 290 258 548 
 
Table 2 presents the description of variables and their means, as well as the test of mean 
differences of the data. The descriptive statistics are presented for farmers who use either the 
monetary payment vehicle (MPV) or the labour payment vehicle (LPV) to maintain the 
irrigation canals. Under each of these sub-samples, the table also presents separate summary 
statistics for those interviewed with the two versions of the questionnaires. 
The findings show that the farmers’ average age is 46 years, in a household of 5.33 persons on 
average, working on a plot size of 2 hectares on average. Leaseholders constitute about 8% of 
the total sample. The leaseholders acquire their plots from owners for a given duration, and 
are responsible for the canal maintenance during the tenure of the lease agreement. The 
subjects under consideration are small-scale farmers. 
As part of the survey, we asked extension officers to rank the level of soil fertility, the degree 
of slope, the soil type, and the degree of erosion on the plots we sampled. On a scale of 1 to 
10, where 1 represents the lowest and 10 the highest, the average slope was set at about 3. 
This indicates the plots are fairly levelled out. As a result, the degree of erosion is also quite 
low, namely an average of 2.21 on the 1–10 scale. The average distance between the town or 
village of residence and the plot in question measured about 4.18 km. 
The Ghanaian Government has also implemented a fertilizer subsidy programme since 2007, 
so we captured the participation in this subsidy scheme as well. About 40% of the total 
respondents benefit from the national subsidy programme. Fertilizer intensity is about 300 kg 
per hectare. 
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 TABLE 2: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES, MEANS, AND TEST OF MEAN DIFFERENCES  
  
Currently using MPV Currently using LPV 
VARIABLES VARIABLES DESCRIPTION MPV LPV DIFF Pooled MPV LPV DIFF Pooled 
              Independent Variables 
        Age Age of the farmer (in years) 45.920 45.270 0.650 45.666 47.819 47.197 0.623 47.624 
Gender Dummy variable for farmer’s gender (1 =  Male) 0.752 0.775 -0.023 0.761 0.776 0.629 0.147** 0.730 
Household size Household size, i.e. number of household members 5.301 5.426 -0.126 5.350 5.239 5.308 5.459 5.308 
Alternative employment Respondent has alternative employment (1 = Yes) 0.552 0.558 -0.006  0.555 0.530 0.606 -0.076 0.554 
Discount rate Discount rate 0.565 0.560 0.005 0.560 0.550 0.640  -0.09** 0.580 
Plot size Plot size (in hectares) 1.984 1.996 -0.012 1.989 2.108 1.960 0.148 2.059 
Plot location Plot location on distributary canal (Tail = 1, Middle/Head = 0) 0.299 0.258 0.041 0.283 0.315 0.356 -0.041 0.328 
Fertilizer Number of fertilizer bags used per hectare 5.916 5.254 0.662** 5.656 6.052 6.290 -0.238 6.127 
Leasehold Dummy for leasehold (1 = Farmer leases plot) 0.089 0.087 0.002 0.088 0.089 0.048 0.041 0.076 
Distance Distance from where the farmer lives to the plot (in km) 4.230 4.379 -0.149 4.288 4.075 3.814 0.261 3.996 
Erosion Level of erosion on scale of 1 to 10 scale (1 is lowest) 2.325 2.500  -0.175** 2.392 1.854 1.914 -0.060 1.873 
Marital status Dummy variable for marital status (1 = Married) 0.883  0.877 0.006 0.881 0.903 0.903 -0.000 0.903 
Wealth Total wealth of the farmer’s household (in GHS) 4,918.45 3,881.82 1,036.63 4,512.16 7,000.45 3,161.64 3,838.81** 5,793.40 
Current money payment Annual contributions towards maintenance of canals (in GHS) 
   
6 
   
0 
Current labour payment Annual contributions towards maintenance of canals (in hours) 
   
0 
   
6 
                Dependent Variables  
        WTP (in money) WTP elicited in monetary units (GHS) per hectare per year 13.974 
 
    13.974 14.590 
 
      14.590 
WTP (in labour) WTP elicited in labour hours per hectare per year 
 
14.750      14.750 
 
16.765      16.765 
WTP with minimum wage WTP elicited in labour, converted to GHS using minimum wage 13.442 5.687 7.755*** 10.335 14.223 6.517  7.705* 11.911 
WTP with sample wage WTP elicited in labour, converted to GHS using sample wage 13.442 13.753 -0.310 13.566 14.223 15.759 -1.536  14.683 
The statistical significance is designated as follows: * represents p < 0.1, ** represents p < 0.05, *** represents p < 0.01. 
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Among those who pay, the mean WTP is GHS 14.22 for the monetary payment vehicle and 
15.34 hours per hectare per year for the non-monetary payment vehicle. These values for the 
WTP are substantially higher than current level of contributions towards canal maintenance, 
namely GHS 6 for money contributions, and six hours per hectare per year for labour 
contributions. 
The two sub-samples – i.e. the farmers who currently use the MPV and those who use the 
LPV – are very similar. The sub-sample pooled means are almost identical. With regard to the 
sub-sample that currently uses the MPV to maintain the canal, the mean differences for 
fertilizer use and level of erosion are statistically significant (i.e. p < 0.05). These indicate that 
fertilizer use is higher among the farmers who were interviewed according to the MPV 
version of the questionnaire. Also, the degree of erosion is higher among the farmers who 
were interviewed with the LPV questionnaire. However, among the farmers who are currently 
using LPV to maintain irrigation canals, the mean differences of gender, discount rate and 
total household wealth are statistically significant (i.e. p < 0.05). The extrapolated average 
discount rate per six months among those farmers using the MPV and LPV for canal 
maintenance is 56% and 58%, respectively. These discount rates are comparable to the 
seasonal interest rate of 50% which the moneylenders charge on loans per season. Studies that 
estimate the rate of time preference in developing countries consistently report high individual 
discount rates (see e.g. Holden et al., 1998).   
There is no standard method for converting WTP or preferences for the maintenance of 
irrigation canals elicited under the MPV and LPV. Among farmers using the MPV to maintain 
canals, the monetary WTP is 13.97 GHS per hectare per year, whilst the labour WTP is 14.75 
hours per hectare per year. Using Ghana’s minimum wage to convert the WTP computed 
under the LPV, we found that the mean difference between monetary WTP and labour WTP 
is statistically significant (i.e. p < 0.01). This means that WTP estimated under the MPV is 
higher than that computed under the LPV. However, this mean difference is not statistically 
significant when we use the mean wage rate of hired labour (i.e. the farmers’ reported mean 
hourly costs for hiring labourers) to convert the labour WTP. For farmers using the LPV to 
maintain the canal, the mean WTP is 14.59 GHS under the MPV, and 16.76 hours under the 
LPV. The mean difference in WTP between the MPV and LPV is statistically significant 
when Ghana’s minimum wage is adopted to convert the hours into monetary units (i.e. p < 
0.1). This result indicates that WTP is higher under the MPV than under the LPV, but when 
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one applies the farmers’ mean wage for hiring labourers, the difference in mean WTP under 
the two payment vehicles is not statistically significant.  
The degree to which respondents accept the scenario is an important criterion for judging the 
overall performance of the CV survey. There is significant support among the respondents in 
respect of improving the irrigation canals. Overall, 92% (548-55=493) of the respondents 
supported the scenario by stating a positive WTP, i.e. they accepted the scenario. For the 
monetary version, the acceptance rate was 90%, while the corresponding figure for the labour 
input contribution was 95%. The high acceptance rates for the CV scenarios may also indicate 
farmers’ dissatisfaction with the current state of irrigation canals. 
During the survey, we explored the reasons for zero WTP bids. Of the 55 respondents, 19 
motivated the zero WTP by stating either that other farmers would not contribute, or that they 
believed that the Government would not use the resources as intended. These are classified as 
protest responses. In addition, 15 respondents indicated a lack of resources to contribute. The 
remaining 21 wanted to change the payment vehicle: 14 of them wanted to change it from 
labour to money, while 7 of them wanted to change it from money to labour.  
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TABLE 3: CONVERGENT VALIDITY TESTS BETWEEN MONETARY AND LABOUR PAYMENT VEHICLES 
Hypotheses Monetary     Labour Difference 
Equality of proportions accepting scenario by payment vehicle 0.905 0.955 -0.049** 
Equality of mean WTP by payment vehicle using minimum wage 13.749 5.931 7.818*** 
Equality of mean WTP by payment vehicle using sample wage 13.749 14.340  -0.592 
 The statistical significance is designated as follows: * represents p < 0.1, ** represents p < 0.05, *** represents p < 0.01. 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: CONVERGENT VALIDITY TESTS FOR EXPERIENCE WITH PAYMENT VEHICLES 
 
ACCEPTANCE RATES 
 
PROTEST RESPONSES 
  WTP in Money WTP in Labour DIFFERENCE 
   
WTP in Money WTP in Labour DIFFERENCE 
Currently use MPV 0.897 0.942 -0.044 
   
0.070 0.037 0.033 
Currently use LPV 0.918 0.984 -0.066* 
   
0.052 0.016 0.036 
The statistical significance is designated as follows: * represents p < 0.1, ** represents p < 0.05, *** represents p < 0.01. 
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We also explored the potential differences in mean WTP for the monetary and non-monetary 
payment vehicles. The results are presented in Table 3. Firstly, we adopted Ghana’s legislated 
minimum wage to convert the WTP elicited in labour units into monetary units. The mean 
WTP for the MPV came to GHS 13.75, while GHS 5.93 was registered for the LPV. The 
difference between the two means is statistically significant (i.e. p < 0.01). However, if we 
use the rice farmers’ wage rate for hired labour in our sample, the mean WTP for the LPV is 
14.34 GHS, which is not statistically different from the 13.75 GHS registered for the MPV.  
Approximately 40% of the respondents benefit from the Government’s fertilizer subsidy 
programme, which could make them more benevolent towards the CV scenario. Hence, we 
tested whether those who benefitted from the subsidy programme were more likely to accept 
the CV scenario we designed for improving the management of the irrigation facilities. The 
results indicate that participation in the subsidy programme had no statistically significant 
effect on the acceptance rates for the new management plan. 
Table 4 provides further analyses of the acceptance rates and protest responses for the MPV 
and LPV under both sub-samples. These results indicate that for the sub-sample who had 
experience with using both payment vehicles to maintain irrigation canals, the acceptance 
rates of the CV scenario does not differ between those who were interviewed using the MPV 
and LPV versions of the questionnaire. However, with regard to the sub-sample who only 
used the LPV to maintain irrigation canals, the difference in proportions who accepted the CV 
scenario under the two payment vehicles is statistically significant (i.e. p < 0.1). This finding 
indicates that the acceptance rate is similar for both payment vehicles if respondents have 
experience with both, but is different when the respondents have experience with only one of 
the payment vehicles. 
With regard to the protest behaviour, there are no differences in the proportions of protest 
responses among farmers who were interviewed either with the MPV or the LPV 
questionnaire in the respective sub-samples. These results indicate that experience with 
payment vehicles reduces time/money response asymmetries.  
As indicated earlier, market imperfections could also create disparities among acceptance 
rates and mean WTP under different payment vehicles. Holden et al. (1998) argue that market 
imperfections lead to variations in the rate of time preference. Hence, we compared the two 
sub-samples in terms of the extrapolated individual discount rates. The result indicates that 
the difference between the discount rates among farmers who have experience with both 
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payment vehicles and those who use only the LPV is not statistically significant. The 
differences in wage rates, wealth, household size and plot size for the sub-samples are also not 
statistically significant. These conclusions indicate that the farmers were behaving under 
similar market environments. Thus, the earlier finding with regard to time/money response 
asymmetries can be linked to experience with payment vehicles. 
The Maximum Likelihood Estimation results using the Tobit Model is presented in Table 5. 
The dependent variables for Models 1 and 3 are WTP stated in monetary units (GHS) and 
those of Models 2 and 4 are WTP stated in labour units (hours). In order to be able to compute 
the natural logarithm of zero bids, all the dependent variables’ values are computed as
( )log 1iWTP + . The Likelihood Ratio indicates that specifications as a whole are statistically 
significant in all four model specifications. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for all the independent variables are simultaneously equal to zero in all model 
specifications.  
21 
 
 
 TABLE 5: REGRESSION RESULTS 
Independent Variables Currently use MPV   Currently use LPV 
WTP in money [1] WTP in labour[2]   WTP in money[3] WTP in labour [4] 
Discount rate -0.370 0.713*** 
 
 -0.954** 0.380    
 
(0.35) (0.27)    
 
(0.43) (0.31)    
Logarithm of age -0.194 0.448* 
 
0.344 0.300    
 
(0.33) (0.23)    
 
(0.46) (0.28)    
Gender -0.124 0.119    
 
0.327 0.354** 
 
(0.22) (0.15)    
 
(0.22) (0.16)    
Location of main distributary canal (Tail end) 0.380* 0.303** 
 
0.600*** 0.173    
 
(0.20) (0.14)    
 
(0.20) (0.14)    
Logarithm of household size 0.399 -0.065    
 
-0.174 -0.757*** 
 
(0.26) (0.20)    
 
(0.34) (0.20)    
Logarithm of distance between plot and place of residence  0.120 -0.036    
 
0.208 -0.142    
 
(0.17) (0.14)    
 
(0.27) (0.15)    
Leasehold 0.250  -0.375*   
 
1.221** 0.170    
 
(0.31) (0.22)    
 
(0.47) (0.25)    
Logarithm of plot size 0.671* -0.334    
 
-0.239  -0.482** 
 
(0.36) (0.27)    
 
(0.39) (0.22)    
Logarithm of fertilizer use -0.077 0.230    
 
-0.244 0.493***  
 
(0.21) (0.14)    
 
(0.27) (0.18)    
Logarithm of total household wealth  -0.172** 0.026    
 
 -0.213*** -0.008    
 
(0.07) (0.04)    
 
(0.07) (0.05)    
Alternative employment 0.502*** -0.164    
 
0.757*** 0.198    
 
(0.19) (0.14)    
 
(0.21) (0.13)    
Constant 2.863* 0.170    
 
2.660 1.661    
  (1.50) (1.00)      (1.76) (1.05)    
McFadden’s R square 0.0884 0.0757 
 
0.3784 0.1521 
Number of observations 98 137    
 
42 92   
Likelihood Ratio Test ( )2 13χ  23.797*** 24.373**      42.882*** 29.915*** 
The statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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Models 1 and 2 provide results for the farmers who currently use the MPV to maintain 
irrigation canals. Whereas Model 1 provides the results for respondents interviewed using the 
MPV version of the questionnaire, Model 2 presents the results for respondents interviewed 
using the LPV version. The location of plots is significant in both models. Farmers whose 
plots are located at the tail end of the distributary canal indicate higher WTP for canal 
maintenance. Barton and Bergland (2010) arrive at the same conclusion in their study on 
farmers in India. Farmers with alternative employment indicate higher WTP to maintain 
irrigation canals under Model 1. Similarly, farmers with relatively bigger plot sizes indicate a 
higher WTP for canal maintenance. Total household wealth is, however, negatively associated 
with WTP for canal maintenance in Model 1. 
With regard to Model 2, farmers who lease their plots are less willing to pay for the 
maintenance of irrigation canals. This is also intuitive, since the leasehold is for a limited 
period: the incentive for improving the quality of irrigation infrastructure is attenuated, 
therefore. This result supports the theoretical model devised by Yoder et al. (2008) on 
contract duration and investment in soil conservation, which suggests that, in comparison with 
their landlords, tenants invest less in soil conservation. 
In Model 2, the age of the farmer and the discount rate are also statistically significant. These 
results indicate that farmers with higher discount rates state a higher WTP in labour hours for 
the maintenance of canals. 
Models 3 and 4 provide the regression results for farmers who use the LPV to maintain 
irrigation canals. Model 3 provides the results for those interviewed using the MPV version of 
the questionnaire, while Model 4 presents the results for those interviewed using the LPV 
version. In Model 3, the discount rate is negatively associated with monetary contributions 
towards the maintenance of irrigation canals. In a study by Holden et al. (1998) in three 
different developing countries in Africa and Asia, it was found that households with 
immediate cash needs had higher rates of time preference; our results are in line with this 
finding. Also, the farmers whose plots are located at the tail end of the distributary canal 
stated a higher monetary WTP. Furthermore, farmers with leasehold contracts and alternative 
employment indicated higher monetary WTP, while household wealth is negatively associated 
with monetary WTP. 
With regard to Model 4, male farmers are likely to contribute labour hours for the 
maintenance of irrigation canals. Fertilizer use also increases with a farmer’s willingness to 
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contribute labour to maintain the canals. However, household size and plot size are negatively 
associated with labour contributions towards canal maintenance. In terms of comparisons of 
regression results under the same payment vehicle, we pooled the data together and ran 
regressions for both payment vehicles separately, with dummy variables for experiencing both 
payment vehicles. These dummy variables are not statistically significant in either model, 
indicating that Model 1 is similar to Model 3, and Model 2 is similar to Model 4. 
 
5.0: Conclusion 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of experience with monetary and 
labour payment vehicles on the relative acceptance of CV scenarios and protest bids in terms 
of these two payment vehicles. A split-sample survey was designed for this purpose. We used 
convergent validity tests to evaluate how experience affected potential differences in the 
farmers’ willingness to pay for maintaining the irrigation canals that fed their plots. The 
results indicate that there is an asymmetry in acceptance rates between the two payment 
vehicles (although not in the rate of protest bids) when respondents only have experience with 
one of the vehicles. However, this asymmetry disappears when respondents have experience 
with both payment vehicles.  
These results suggest that being familiar with monetary and labour payment vehicles 
attenuates time/money response asymmetry in the CVM. The study has implications for the 
conduct of the CVM and devolution policies in developing countries. In terms of the conduct 
of the CVM, these results suggest that the payment vehicles we adopt in the CVM should not 
be of paramount concern. Thus, if the respondents are fairly familiar with the payment 
vehicles, both acceptance and total WTP could be comparable across different payment 
vehicles. Also, devolution policies do not need to adopt a particular payment vehicle to 
promote participation. 
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